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Abstract: Equine piroplasmosis (EP) is a tick borne disease of equids. It is considered
a foreign animal disease in the United States. However, from January 2009 through
November 2010, 542 confirmed positive cases have been identified in 16 different
States. This domestic pathways assessment evaluates the risk of releasing an EP
pathogen (Theileria equi or Babesia caballi) from a quarantined premises through
movement of horses. In addition, this assessment evaluates the risk of disease
transmission by ticks, vertical transmission, or iatrogenic transmission.
When an acaricide is applied correctly, the risk of EP transmission by ticks to a horse
is low. In addition, infected reservoir hosts, environmental factors, and competent
vectors must be present for the disease transmission cycle to occur. Vertical
transmission of T. equi is considered a moderate risk pathway and the risk of vertical
transmission of B. caballi is negligible.
Iatrogenic transmission via whole blood transfusion, blood doping, commercial
serum/blood plasma, and contaminated equipment poses the highest risk of disease
transmission. Blood is an efficient vehicle of transmission for EP pathogens and even
a small volume of blood can be infectious. Exposure of an uninfected horse to any of
these pathways is likely to result in EP transmission. Iatrogenic exposure may be
difficult to regulate. Management practices such as testing blood donors would help
mitigate this risk but these practices vary throughout the equine industry.
The overall risk of EP spread by the movement of a horse from a quarantined premises
is moderate.
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ACRONYMS
APHIS

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

cELISA

competitive inhibition enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay

CF

complement fixation test

EP

equine piroplasmosis

IFAT

indirect fluorescence antibody test

IPM

integrated pest management

LAMP

loop-mediated isothermal amplification

MAb

monoclonal antibody

NAHMS

National Animal Health Monitoring System

NVSL

National Veterinary Services Laboratories

OIE

World Organization for Animal Health

PCR

polymerase chain reaction

USDA

United States Department of Agriculture

VS

Veterinary Services

DEFINITIONS
confirmed positive horse

A horse that has tested positive for an EP pathogen with either a complement fixation
test (CF) or a competitive enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (cELISA) conducted by
NVSL. A horse can be classified as a confirmed positive case without showing
evidence of clinical disease of EP. (USDA 2009)

contiguous United States

The 48 United States that have common land borders with each other.

biocontainment

Prevention of disease spread within or between operations.

biosecurity

Prevention of disease introduction.

EP pathogen

Babesia caballi or Theileria equi.

exposed horse

A horse in the same herd as a confirmed positive horse or a horse that has had recent
direct and sustained contact with a confirmed positive horse, as determined by State
and Federal regulatory officials in consultation with epidemiologist. (USDA 2009)

exposure assessment

The exposure assessment estimates the likelihood of exposure and the risk of
transmission if an uninfected horse is exposed to the EP pathogen by: ticks, vertical
transmission, or iatrogenic transmission of blood or blood components.

exotic

Not known to be present in the contiguous United States.

gold standard

Gold standard test refers to a diagnostic test or benchmark that is regarded as
definitive.

high risk

This event would be very likely to occur.

horse

Equus caballus

Acronyms and Definitions

iii

USDA:APHIS:VS:CEAH:National Center for Risk Analysis

iv

infected undetected horse

A horse that is infected but has been tested with either a complement fixation (CF) test
or a competitive enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (cELISA) conducted by NVSL
and results indicate the animal is not infected.

intrastadial transmission

Transmission of B. caballi or T. equi to a horse by a tick that acquired the pathogen
during the same lifecycle stage.

known donor

A horse used as a blood donor and whose identity is “known” by the teams performing
the transfusion.

low risk

The event would be unlikely to occur.

moderate risk

This event would occur with an even probability.

negligible risk

The event would be unlikely to occur.

operation

An area of land managed as a unit by an individual, partnership, or hired manager.

potential tick vector

Any tick species considered competent to transmit B. caballi or T. equi to a horse.

additions

A horse purchased from outside an operation and transported to the purchasing
operation for housing, training, breeding, riding, or racing.

quarantined premises

Premises with at least one confirmed positive case of EP and that is subject to the
biosecurity measures outlined in VS Memorandum 555.20 low-risk premises. (USDA
2009)

race horse

A horse whose primary use is competition on sanctioned or unsanctioned race tracks.

release assessment

The release assessment estimates the likelihood that an EP pathogen will be released
from a quarantined premises. The pathways for release examined were confirmed
positive horse and a test negative exposed horse.

show/event horse

A horse used primarily in competition other than racing.

sanctioned racing

Horseracing conducted by the approval and regulation of State authority and/or racing
commissions.

spread

New infection of at least one horse or tick vector with an EP pathogen.

trail and ranch horses

Horses used for farm, ranch or other noncompetitive uses.

transovarial transmission

Transmission of B. caballi or T. equi from a female tick to its offspring by infection of the
eggs in the ovaries of the tick.

transstadial transmission

Transmission of B. caballi or T. equi to an equid by a tick in a lifecycle stage
subsequent to the stage in which the tick acquired the pathogen.

unsanctioned racing

Horseracing conducted without the approval and regulation of State authority or official
racing commission.

Acronyms and Definitions
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Equine piroplasmosis (EP) is a tick borne disease of equids and is considered an exotic disease in
the United States. From January 2009 through November 2010, 542 confirmed positive cases
were identified in 16 different States (Figure 1). Of those, 412 cases were associated with one
outbreak initiating in Texas. The National Equine Piroplasmosis Working Group, consisting of
industry, State, and Federal representatives, developed long-term recommendations for the
management and removal of EP in the United States. One recommendation was to conduct an
assessment to estimate the risk of EP spread posed by the interstate movement of horses from a
quarantined premises to events or other premises.

Release Pathways
This pathways assessment evaluates the risk of releasing an EP pathogen (Theileria equi or
Babesia caballi) from a quarantined premises through movement of horses. The release pathways
considered were:
1) movement of confirmed positive horses, and
2) movement of infected undetected horses.

Figure 1. Total number of horses confirmed positive with equine piroplasmosis from January
2009 through November 2010.

Executive Summary
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The testing protocol outlined in VS Memorandum 555.20 results in a low risk that an infected
horse will test negative for EP (i.e., infected undetected horse) when tested with both cELISA and
CF. The risk is moderate if a horse is tested with cELISA alone. If a horse is confirmed positive,
the likelihood that the horse is truly infected with an EP pathogen is high; therefore, the risk of
releasing an EP pathogen via this pathway is high.

Exposure Pathways

The risk is low that an infected tick
would remain attached to a horse
moving off a quarantined premises
when acaricide is applied correctly.
Within a tick population, EP
infections quickly die out without the
presence of infected hosts because
each generation of tick must be
exposed to the organism. Therefore,
EP is only maintained if at least one
infected horse is present in the
population. As a result, the risk of
continued spread of an EP pathogen
by ticks alone is low.
Vertical transmission of T. equi from mares is a moderate risk pathway.
Because transmission has not occurred between mares infected with B.
caballi and their offspring, vertical transmission of B. caballi is a
considered negligible.

American dog tick

American dog tick

Blood is an efficient vehicle of transmission for EP pathogens. Even a small volume of blood can be
infectious. Of the iatrogenic exposure pathways assessed, whole blood transfusion, blood doping,
commercial serum/blood plasma, and contaminated equipment are all considered high-risk
pathways. Germplasm is the only iatrogenic exposure pathway considered in this assessment to
pose a negligible risk.
In order for a horse to become infected by the exposure pathways described above, the horse must
have the opportunity for sufficient contact with an infected population. Biosecurity practices vary
throughout the equine industry. As a result, it is difficult to estimate the impact of mitigation
measures other than regulatory requirements. Because of the continued monitoring, acaricide
treatment, and identification of confirmed positive horses as outlined in this document, these

2
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Photo by Angela M. James, USDA:APHIS:VS:CEAH:NCRA.
Cumberland Island, GA. 1996.

The exposure pathways assessed for EP transmission to an uninfected horse were ticks, vertical
transmission, and iatrogenic transmission via blood contamination. In this document, the risk
associated with an exposure pathway is based on the ability of that pathway to result in transmission.
Horse to horse contact alone is not sufficient for transmission of EP. If an EP pathogen is released
onto a premises, the uninfected horse must be exposed to blood from an infected horse via mechanical
or tick transmission.

EP Domestic Pathways Assessment (2011)

horses would have little opportunity to expose uninfected horses. In contrast, infected undetected
horses have no requirements for identification. They also do not require acaricide treatment or
additional testing after leaving the quarantined premises. This population poses a much greater
risk of exposing uninfected horses to EP agents.

Summary
In summary, if an infected undetected horse releases EP from a quarantined premises, iatrogenic
mechanisms pose the greatest risk for transmission to a new horse. This is due to the uncertainty
about biosecurity practices, the large number of organisms present in a small volume of blood,
and the small infectious dose. Iatrogenic transmission via blood or blood products has been the
cause of several outbreaks worldwide. It is unknown how frequently practices such as blood
doping or sharing of equipment occur throughout the industry. Currently, test negative horses
leaving a quarantined premises have no requirements for identification or continued monitoring to
ensure these horses are not infected undetected. The overall risk of this pathway is moderate.
If a confirmed positive horse releases EP from a premises, iatrogenic transmission may still
occur. In addition, vertical transmission may occur if these horses are bred. The overall risk posed
by the movement of confirmed positive horses is moderate.

Executive Summary
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background _______________________________________________________
The United States was considered free of equine piroplasmosis (EP) in 1988. Since 2009, 16
States have identified at least one EP case related to previous importation or trace investigations
from other affected premises. Of those cases identified, 124 cases have been associated with T.
equi (Figure 2) and 6 cases have been associated with B. caballi (Figure 3). In addition, as of
November 1, 2010, 412 horses (out of a total population of 2,489 horses tested) were confirmed
positive to T. equi (Figure 4) associated with an outbreak from one-affected premises in Texas.

Figure 2. The number of horses confirmed positive with T. equi in the United States from November 1,
2009 through November 1, 2010, excluding those associated with the Texas outbreak.

4
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Figure 3. B. caballi confirmed positive horses from November 1, 2009 through November 1,
2010.

Figure 4. Number of horses confirmed positive with T. equi associated with an outbreak
initiating in Texas from October 2009 through November 2010.
Introduction
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The National Equine Piroplasmosis Working Group, which consists of industry, State, and
Federal representatives, was established to provide guidance to USDA:APHIS:VS and the States
to control EP. In April 2010, the group requested a risk assessment be conducted to estimate the
risk of EP spread posed by horses moving off a quarantined premises.
The objective of this assessment is to identify the likelihood that the interstate movement of a
horse off a quarantined premises will result in at least one horse in a new location becoming
infected with an EP pathogen. This risk assessment evaluates the efficacy of current management
practices for quarantined premises, as well as an option to allow confirmed positive horses to
attend shows, races, or other equid events. Results of this work will be provided to the National
EP Working Group and VS to strengthen current management practices and inform policy.

1.2. Methods___________________________________________________________
The process used in this assessment is a modification of OIE’s guidelines for import risk analysis
(OIE 2008), which consists of a hazard identification, release assessment, exposure assessment,
consequence assessment, and an overall risk estimation. Because the objective is to identify the
likelihood of at least one horse becoming infected, this assessment does not consider the
magnitude of the effect (i.e., biological or economic consequences) once a new horse becomes
infected. Without this consequence assessment, this analysis is referred to as a “Pathways
Assessment” rather than a “Risk Assessment.” A pathways assessment describes the biological
pathways necessary for the pathogen to spread from the infected population to the uninfected
population of concern, and the likelihood of these events occurring. The hazards identified are B.
caballi and T. equi, the causative agents of EP.
In this assessment, the infected population is defined as horses on quarantined premises that are
infected with an EP pathogen. The infection in each of these horses might be confirmed by a
positive EP test result, or it might be undetected because of a false negative EP test result. The
uninfected population at risk is any uninfected horse exposed to the infected population through
movement of an infected horse from a quarantined premises. The likelihood that a horse that tests
negative on a quarantined premises is infected was estimated, based on USDA:APHIS:VS’
approved testing protocol, through a stochastic simulation model using risk and decision analysis
software @RISK by Palisade Corporation (Palisade 2009).
Published literature and reports from recent outbreaks were used to identify the potential release
and exposure pathways. Appendix A. Literature Review of EP Release and Exposure summarizes
the results of a literature review aimed at determining sources of introduction of EP to new areas
and means of spread either following introduction or in an enzootic area. Worldwide, importation
of infected horses is the only introduction pathway, which has been reported to lead to outbreaks
of EP in regions in which the disease was not enzootic. As the table shows, EP has been shown to
spread from infected to uninfected horses via ticks, vertical transmission, and iatrogenic
transmission such as needle sharing or syringe reuse.

6
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The release assessment estimates the likelihood that an EP pathogen will leave a quarantined
premises. The release pathways considered were:
a.

A confirmed positive horse temporarily leaving the premises

b.

An infected, undetected horse permanently leaving the premises

Given that the pathogen successfully left a quarantined premises, the exposure assessment
estimates the likelihood that exposure to a specific pathway would result in transmission to an
uninfected horse. The exposure pathways considered include:
a.

Ticks
• An infected tick attached to a horse leaving a quarantined premises
•

Establishment of infection in the tick population on a new premises

b.

Vertical transmission

c.

Iatrogenic transmission via blood or blood components such as:
• Whole blood transfusion (for medical purposes)
•

Blood doping (for non-medical purposes)

•

Commercial serum/plasma products

•

Equipment (e.g., needles and dental or tattoo equipment)

•

Germplasm

Infected ticks may attach to other hosts, which may move off a quarantined premises, however
this assessment is specifically addressing the interstate movement of horses and did not consider
other host movements off the premises.
While the risk of transmission associated with each of these exposure pathways can be described
(Figure 5), the likelihood of exposure to an EP pathogen is more difficult to estimate due to
uncertainty about management practices throughout the industry or the use of biosecurity or other
mitigation measures. The baseline mitigation measures evaluated were current Federal
regulations and recommendations. A general description of risk specific to certain sectors was
provided.

Introduction

7

USDA:APHIS:VS:CEAH:National Center for Risk Analysis

Quarantined
Premises

Affected population

Release pathways

v
v

Confirmed positive horses
Infected undetected horses

Exposure pathways

v
v
v

Direct tranmsision
Iatrogenic
Infected tick

At least one naïve horse becomes
infected

Consequence

Figure 5. Pathway scenario for the general equine population.

The overall estimation of risk is based on the risk of release, risk of transmission from exposure,
and likelihood of exposure.

1.3. Risk and Uncertainty Estimation ______________________________________
For each pathway, the likelihood that the pathway would result in the EP pathogen leaving the
premises (release) or infection of a new horse (exposure) was estimated through qualitative or
quantitative methods. Both results were communicated through a qualitative risk ranking system
described in Table 1.
Table 1. Definitions for risk estimates.

Risk estimation

Descriptive definition of
qualitative results

High

This event would be very likely to occur

Moderate

This event would occur with an even probability

Low

The event would be unlikely to occur

Negligible

The event would almost certainly never occur

Probability outcome for
quantitative results
>40%
1-39.999999%
.000001-1%
<.000001%

In addition, the degree of uncertainty was captured based on the level of information available for
qualitative estimates (Table 2).

8
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Table 2. Level of uncertainty about the likelihood estimates.
Uncertainty
category

Definition

Low

The data available are solid and complete. Multiple published references or reliable
databases and records are available. Different sources are generally in agreement.

Medium

Some, but not complete data are available. A small number of published references
or reliable databases and records are available. If personal communication or
anecdotal evidence is used in combination with published information, then it is from
multiple reliable sources that are generally in agreement.

High

No published data are available. The only evidence is in the form of personal
communications, anecdotal reports, or unpublished data.

1.4. Assumptions_______________________________________________________
The baseline mitigation measures that were considered for the release assessment were based on
the VS Memorandum 555.20. It is assumed that horses on quarantined premises will be treated as
test negative horses on Low-Risk premises (as defined in the VS Memorandum), which initial
intervention includes:
• All exposed horses are tested for EP and negatives are retested 30 days later
•

A 10-foot separation is maintained between negative and positive horses

•

The facility is inspected by State animal health authority

•

Vegetation is minimized and an acaricide is applied

•

Treating horses with acaricide twice

•

Acaricide application is consistent with VS Memorandum 556.1.

In addition, horses with a negative test within 30 days and with acaricide application within 14
days can move off the premises permanently. No additional testing or treatment is required.
VS Memorandum 555.20 does have provisions for the interstate movement of test-positive
horses. Therefore, test-positive horses were assumed to move temporarily and consistent with a
combination of draft measures outlined by the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC 2009)
and USDA:APHIS:VS (unpublished). Management of grounds on the premises was not
considered as a standard mitigation because it was not a standard recommendation.
The mitigations applied to the movement of test positive horses in this assessment include:
• A permit is issued by the State or Federal Animal Health Agency prior to movement.
•

Horses are spray treated with a pyrethroid not less than 24 hours or more than 14
days prior to any movement.

•

Horses are sprayed with acaricide every 14-18 days while off the premises.

•

Horses have a unique identifier and their location and transport monitored.

•

Horses return within one day of finishing the event.

•

Horses will not be accepted as blood donors.

•

Foals born to positive mares will be maintained under hold order until they are
weaned /separated from the mare and have negative cELISA, CF, and PCR tests at a
minimum of 6 months of age, and met the requirements listed above.
Introduction
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2. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Epidemiology describes the distribution and determinants of a disease in the population. The
epidemiology of a disease is an important component in estimating risk because it describes how
a pathogen is transmitted as well as host susceptibility. In order for a disease to occur the
appropriate agent, host, and environmental conditions must be present. Equine piroplasmosis is a
tick-borne parasitic infection of horses, mules, donkeys and zebras (Friedhoff and Soulé 1996).

2.1. Agents ____________________________________________________________
Equine piroplasmosis is caused by the protozoan parasites Babesia caballi or Theileria equi. The
etiologic agents of EP, B. caballi and T. equi, have complex life cycles that include obligate
sexual stages in the guts of their tick vectors. Consequently, only ticks that are competent vectors
(ticks that are capable of supporting the development of the parasite) biologically transmit these
parasites.
The nomenclature of T. equi (versus B. equi) has been debated due to the developmental phase of
T. equi in the lymphocyte (Ali, Sugimoto et al. 1996). OIE guidelines state that: “Theileria equi
was previously designated as Babesia equi but compelling evolutionary, morphologic,
biochemical, and genetic evidence supports its reclassification as a Theileria” (OIE 2009a). This
document will remain consistent with OIE terminology.
The following table demonstrates some key characteristics and differences between the two
organisms.
Table 3. Characteristics and key differences between B. caballi and T. equi.
B. caballi

10

T. equi

Distribution in the United
States; Nov 2009-Nov 2010
(USDA Sit Rep, Nov 2010,
unpublished)

6 positive horses in 5 States

124 positive horses in 16 States
plus an ongoing outbreak
investigation originating from Texas
that includes 412 horses

Tick Transmission

Zygotes can be found in various
organs of tick vectors and must
transmit transovarially from egg to
larva to be found in the salivary
glands (Uilenberg 2006)

Zygotes develop in salivary glands
of tick vector and not found in other
tick organs; not transmitted
transovarially from egg to larva
(Uilenberg 2006)

Vertical Transmission

Intrauterine infections have been
reported but are rare and usually
lead to abortion (de Waal 1992)

Mares can transmit the infection
throughout their lives to their
offspring, resulting in abortions,
stillbirths or carrier offspring (de
Waal 1992)

Infection in horses

Development does not include a
lymphocyte stage (Uilenberg 2006)
and does not cause adhesions of
infected erythrocytes to vascular
endothelium (Ali, Sugimoto et al.
1996).

Initial development in the
lymphocyte with further
development and asexual
reproduction in erythrocytes
(Uilenberg 2006)

Incubation period

10 to 30 days (de Waal 1992)

12 to 19 days (de Waal 1992)

Parasitemia

0.1-10% (Ali, Sugimoto et al. 1996)

May be >20%, but 1-5% most
common (Ali, Sugimoto et al. 1996)
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B. caballi

T. equi

Clinical Signs

Infections are more likely to be
unapparent or mild (Ali, Sugimoto
et al. 1996). However, kinin
releases may lead to cerebral
babesiosos (Ali, Sugimoto et al.
1996)

Variable

Immune Response

Once described as self-limiting but
lasting up to 4 years after initial
infection, however, may be lifelong
but undetected by current tests
(Rothschild and Knowles 2007)

Cannot be eliminated from the
body by the immune response;
even with treatment the horses
remain infected for life (Rothschild
and Knowles 2007)

Diagnosis: Blood Smear

Merozoites are seen exclusively in
erythrocytes and typically as pairs
joined at the posterior end (de
Waal 1992)

In macrophages early in infection.
Visualized in erythrocytes as
merozoites in a Maltese-cross
formation of 4 pyriform parasites
(de Waal 1992)

Diagnosis: serology

Higher Se/Sp on Complement
Fixation compared to T. equi on CF

Higher sensitive (Se) and specific
(Sp) on cELISA compared to B.
caballi on cELISA

2.2. Host ______________________________________________________________
2.1.1. Susceptibility
Horses in endemic regions may have a low case fatality rate (5-10 percent) (Rothschild and
Knowles 2007). However, the case fatality rate may increase significantly among naïve mature
horses (Maurer 1962; Rothschild and Knowles 2007). Persistent infection of T. equi is thought to
be a common cause of abortion in endemic regions (de Waal 1992; Lewis, Penzhorn et al. 1999).
Susceptibility does not appear to vary with age (Acici, Umur et al. 2008) or sex (Asgarali,
Coombs et al. 2007).
Clinical signs vary from acute death in the peracute form (rare); fever, anorexia, anemia, and
lethargy in the acute form (most common): and reduced performance and weight loss in the
chronic form. Transmission occurs through ticks as biological vectors, or through mechanical
transmission by iatrogenic inoculation with infected blood (Ali, Sugimoto et al. 1996). Vertical
transmission of T. equi also occurs in horses. Dual infections with both organisms have been
reported and cross-immunity does not occur.
2.2.2. Description of the Equine Population
Currently no accurate estimate of the current total number of horses in the United States exists.
According to the 2007 Census of Agriculture, the total inventory of horses in the United States is
4,028,827 on 575,942 farms (Figure 6). However, this census only counts horses that are on a
farm, or places that sells $1,000 of agriculture products or has 5 or more equids (other than
commercial enterprises such as racetracks) (USDA 2007a).
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Figure 6. Horse and Pony Inventory, NASS 2007

The United States Department of Agriculture also described U.S. equine populations in a survey
of operations with 5 or more horses in 28 States and 4 regions representing 78 percent of all
horses and 78.6 percent of all premises (USDA 2007a). The highest rate of household horse
ownership was in the Mountain Region (3.2 percent of households), followed by the Central (2.6
percent) and South Central (2.8 percent) Regions. The Pacific region was intermediate (2.1
percent), followed by the North Central (1.4 percent) and Atlantic regions at about 1 percent.
Small operations (5-9 animals) contained about 66 percent of the horse population, medium
operations (10-19 horses) contained about 26 percent, and large operations (20 or more horses)
contained about 8 percent of the total population. The horse population in the United States is
distributed between private users such as ranches, farms, and hobby owners and commercial
operations engaged in breeding, boarding, training, racing, and showing. By function, about 40
percent of premises were farms or ranches, 37 percent were personal use, and the remaining 23
percent of operations were primarily boarding and breeding facilities (NAHMS 2006) . The pet
horse population was estimated at about 7.3 million horses housed on about 2.1 million facilities
and households (AVMA 2007).
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Equine piroplasmosis has been identified in Quarter Horse racehorses, Thoroughbred racehorses,
and ranch horses during 2009 through November 2010.

2.3. Vector
Equine piroplasmosis is primarily a tick-borne disease. There are three main modes of tick-borne
transmission of B. caballi parasites: transstadial, intrastadial, and transovarial. Tick bornetransmission of T. equi can occur through transstadial or intrastadial mechanisms; transovarial
transmission of T. equi in ticks is uncertain or absent. Transstadial transmission occurs when a
tick (larval or nymphal) acquires the pathogen from an infected host in one lifecycle stage and
then transmits it to another host in the next lifecycle stage. The pathogen is retained by the tick
through the molting process (i.e., nymph to adult). Intrastadial transmission occurs when a tick
acquires the pathogen and transmits to a naïve host without development or molting to another
life stage. Transovarial transmission occurs when an infected female tick passes the pathogen to
eggs, resulting in infected offspring (Ueti, Palmer et al. 2008).
Historically, Anocentor (Dermacentor) nitens, the tropical horse tick, was thought to be the only
known natural vector of EP (Babesia caballi) in the United States (Roby and Anthony 1963).
Recent evidence suggests that D. variabilis, American dog tick and Amblyomma cajennense, the
cayenne tick, may be natural vectors of T. equi as demonstrated with the field collection of adults
and transmission of T. equi to naïve horses (Scoles 2010).
Rhipicephalus microplus is an experimental vector of T. equi, and evidence is growing that R.
microplus is likely a natural vector of T. equi in subtropical and tropical regions of the Americas
(Knowles, Kappmeyer et al. 1992; Guimarães, Lima et al. 1998; Heuchert, de Giulli Jr. et al.
1999; Battsetseg, Lucero et al. 2002). Transstadial transmission of T. equi by R. microplus has
been confirmed with the acquisition of parasites by the nymphal stage from chronically infected
horses and transmitting as a newly molted adult to a naïve host (Stiller, Goff et al. 2002; Ueti,
Palmer et al. 2005). Additionally, R. microplus males can acquire T. equi parasites from
chronically infected horses and transmit the parasites to naïve horses through intrastadial
transmission (Ueti, Palmer et al. 2008).
In addition to the four species of ticks that are proven or suspected to be natural EP vectors,
Dermacentor albipictus, the winter tick, has been shown to transmit B. caballi and T. equi under
laboratory conditions. Rhipicephalus sanguineus, brown dog tick, has been reported as a vector of
B. caballi and T. equi, but there is no evidence that this tick species is an EP vector in the United
States (Kouam, Kantzoura et al. 2010). A list of competent vectors with evidence for vector
competence is located in Table 4. A map of potential vector distribution can be found in Figure 7.

2.4. Environment
In addition to tick borne transmission, EP pathogens may be transmitted mechanically through
fomites contaminated with blood. Blood infected with Babesia microti, the causative agent of
human babesiosis, may remain infective for up to 3 days at room temperature and up to 17 days
with refrigeration (Eberhard, Walker et al. 1995). Survival of other Babesia species in blood is
presumed to be similar to B. microti.
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Table 4. Known natural and experimental EP tick vectors in the United States.
Babesia caballi
Evidence of
competence

Mode of
transmission

Evidence of
competence
Experimental

R. microplus
A. nitens

Natural

Transovarial
Transstadial

D. variabilis

Experimental

Transovarial

A. cajennense
D. albipictus

Theileria equi

Experimental

Mode of
transmission
Transstadial and
Intrastadial

Distribution
Limited to southern Texas
Limited to southern Texas

Natural and
Experimental*

Intrastadial

Wide distribution across the
United States

Natural and
Experimental*

Intrastadial

Limited to southern Texas

Transovarial

Wide distribution across the
United States

Adapted from (Stiller and Coan 1995; Stiller, Goff et al. 2002; Ueti, Palmer et al. 2008)
*(Scoles 2010)

Figure 7. Reported distribution by State of potential equine piroplasmosis vectors in the United States.
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3. RELEASE ASSESSMENT
The release assessment estimates the likelihood that an EP pathogen will be released from a
quarantined premises. The pathways for release examined were the movement of a confirmed
positive horse and a infected undetected horse.

3.1. Diagnosis _________________________________________________________
To understand the likelihood of release, the accuracy of diagnostic tests must first be discussed.
Microscopic identification of parasites in stained blood is possible; however, identification in
chronically infected animals may be difficult due to low parasitemia. Other techniques for
identifying the organism, such as polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and the loop-mediated
isothermal amplification (LAMP) can be used to detect DNA of the EP pathogens (Alhassan,
Govind et al. 2007). These tests are not currently approved for regulatory diagnostic purposes in
the United States.
Several serologic tests are available for the detection of T. equi or B. caballi infections. OIE
currently recommends the indirect florescent antibody (IFA) and enzyme-linked immunosorbent
assay (ELISA) for international trading purposes. However, the tests currently approved to
classify horses in the United States include the CF and cELISA tests. These are the only tests
evaluated in this assessment. The cELISA uses a recombinant protein and a specific monoclonal
antibody (MAb) to identify antibody response to surface proteins on a specific lifecycle stage of
the EP pathogens (merozoite). Antibody detection with the CF test disappears 2-3 months after
infection in B. caballi- infected horses (Weiland 1986). The cELISA is more sensitive than CF at
detecting chronically infected horses (Knowles, Kappmeyer et al. 1992; Kappmeyer, Perryman et
al. 1999a).
A description of test performance reported in the literature can be found in Appendix C.
Performance of Diagnostic Tests Over Time.
3.1.1. Sensitivity/specificity
No diagnostic test is 100 percent accurate at detecting the presence or absence of disease in a
population. The ability of a diagnostic test to correctly identify an infected animal as positive on a
diagnostic test is referred to as sensitivity. Animals that are infected but test results indicate they
are not infected (test negative) are referred to as false negatives or infected undetected. The
ability of a diagnostic test to correctly identify an uninfected individual as negative is referred to
as specificity. Animals which are not infected but tests results are positive are referred to as false
positives.
Reported sensitivities and specificities for serologic tests for EP are difficult to interpret due to a
lack of a gold standard to compare with the serologic tests. For this assessment, the diagnostic
characteristics of cELISA and CF tests for detection of T. equi and B. caballi were estimated
using Bayesian analysis using WINBUGS version 3.0.3 software (MRC Biostatistics Unit 2007).
Specifically, the uncertainty distributions (posterior) for the test characteristics were estimated
from cross-testing data where the target populations were tested using both cELISA and CF. This
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analysis only included the cELISA currently approved and licensed in the United States (VMRD
cELISA).
The benefits of Bayesian analysis for this application include:
•

Data from different sources can be combined to estimate the test characteristics.

•

Data with unknown characteristics, such as prevalence in the target population, can
be utilized.

3.1.1.1. Assumptions

The assumptions used in this analysis included:
• The sensitivity and specificity of the cELISA and CF tests are the same in data from
various sources considered in the analysis.
•

The results of the cELISA and CF tests are conditionally independent, depending
only on whether the sample is a true positive or true negative.

•

The impact of time since exposure to the parasite on cELISA and CF test
characteristics are not considered in the current analysis.

•

The sensitivity and specificity of cELISA for detecting T. equi and B. caballi are
greater than 50 percent.

3.1.1.2. Model

The distributions for the sensitivity and specificity were estimated separately for T. equi and B.
caballi. The uncertainty distributions (posterior) for the test characteristics were estimated
through Markov Chain Monte-Carlo sampling using WINBUGS v 3.03 software. Uniform prior
distribution was used for most parameters. Four chains were simulated for 50,000 iterations each.
Convergence was monitored by comparing the results across different chains.
3.1.1.3. Data

The data used for this analysis included:
For T. equi
• A comparison of CF and cELISA results with sera sequentially obtained from 4
horses for 60 days after experimental exposure to T. equi and to B. caballi (Katz,
Dewald et al. 2000).
•

154 samples from 19 countries were tested for T. equi using CF and cELISA
(Knowles, Perryman et al. 1991).

•

CFT and cELISA test results for 292 samples classified as true positives (VS reported
outbreak data, unpublished).

For B. caballi
• 289 samples submitted to NVSL and tested for B. caballi using CF and cELISA
(Kappmeyer, Perryman et al. 1999b).
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3.1.1.4. Results

The sensitivity of cELISA for detecting T. equi was estimated to be 96 percent (90 percent C.I.
94-98) as shown in Table 5. A caveat in the application of these results is that sensitivity of
cELISA could be considerably lower if there are a higher proportion of recently exposed horses
in the target population. In addition, test variation may occur depending on the cELISA test kit
used. According to VS Memorandum 555.20, all exposed equids must be retested at least 30 days
from the last exposure to a positive equid. This analysis did not consider retesting of these
animals. The sensitivity of cELISA for detecting B. caballi may be lower than for detecting T.
equi based on the preliminary results (Table 6). The specificity of the cELISA is greater for B.
caballi (98 percent) than T. equi (95 percent).
There is greater uncertainty regarding the sensitivity of CF, which is 47 percent for the detection
of T. equi and 88 percent for the detection of B. caballi. The sensitivity estimates from different
data sources had a greater variance for this parameter.
Table 5. Test Characteristics of CF and cELISA for detecting T. equi.
Test
C-ELISA
CF

Test Characteristic

Mean

95 Min

95 Max

Sensitivity

96%

94%

98%

Specificity

95%

83%

99%

Sensitivity

47%

42%

51%

Specificity

94%

83%

99%

Table 6 .Test characteristics of CF and cELISA for detecting B. caballi.
Test
C-ELISA

CF

Test Characteristic

Mean

95 Min

95 Max

Sensitivity

91%

85%

96%

Specificity

70%

60%

85%

Sensitivity

88%

63%

99%

Specificity

98%

95%

99%

3.2. Release Pathway 1: Confirmed Positive Cases
Currently, under VS Memorandum 555.20 a confirmed positive case is any horse that has tested
positive by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) with either a CF or cEISA test.
A horse can be classified as a confirmed-positive case without showing evidence of clinical
disease. (USDA 2009) Animals with positive test results on one test may not be positive on
another test (Donnelly, Joyner et al. 1980; Tenter and Friedhoff 1986a; Heuchert, de Giulli Jr et
al. 1999). There is no cross immunity between the two organisms (Maurer 1962; Taylor, Bryant
et al. 1969), so infection with only one organism would not likely result in a positive test for the
other organism.
When an animal tests positive for EP, two possibilities exist: 1) the horse is truly infected, or 2)
the horse is uninfected and the test result (for any number of reasons) is incorrect. In this section,
the likelihood that a horse with a positive test result is truly infected with EP will be determined.
Release Assessment
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The positive predictive value of a test is the likelihood that an animal is truly infected, given a
positive test result. In order for a confirmed positive case to release an EP pathogen off the
premises, the horse must test positive and be infected with the organism at the time of movement.
In order to estimate the number of confirmed positive animals that are truly infected, the positive
predictive value was estimated based on the sensitivity and specificity described above using the
following formula:
Positive predictive value =
1-[(1-SpTest1)*(1-SpTest2)*(…) / ((1-SpTest1)*(1-SpTest2)*(…)+SeTest1*SeTest2*…)]
The positive predictive value was estimated for horses that underwent both the CF and cELISA
tests, and horses tested with only cELISA. It is not common practice to test with CF only. From
100 test positive animals for T equi, the mean number of animals which may be truly infected is
76 using cELISA, and 98 when tested with both CF and cELISA. This is similar for B caballi
(Table 7). Therefore, the likelihood that a horse with a positive test result is infected with EP is
high. It then follows that if a confirmed positive case leaves the quarantined premises, the risk
that it will carry the EP pathogen off the premises (release) is high (>40 percent).
Table 7. Positive predictive value. Probability that a test positive animal is infected.

cELISA only

cELISA and CF

Mean

Min (5%
confidence)

Max (95%
confidence)

T equi

76.23%

64.05%

88.21%

B. caballi

77.70%

64.70%

91.02%

T equi

98.31%

93.53%

99.92%

B caballi

99.14%

96.51%

99.87%

Title 9 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 71.3 does not currently allow for interstate
movement of confirmed positive cases, therefore it is assumed that these horses only move
temporarily to a race, show or other equid event as described in section 1.4.
Some treatments for B. caballi have been considered effective at eliminating the parasites
(Weiland 1986); however, treatment is not part of routine management of EP cases. Therefore,
movement of confirmed positive animals after treatment was not assessed.
The risk that a confirmed positive case is infected and releasing EP agent is high.

3.3. Release Pathway 2: Infected Undetected Horses _________________________
Horses are allowed to move off a quarantined premises after negative tests and acaricide
application. When an animal tests negative for EP, one of two possibilities exist: 1) the animal is
truly uninfected or 2) the animal is infected but the test fails to detect the infection. It is this later
population, referred to as infected undetected horses, which can move EP pathogens off the
premises.
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The likelihood that a test will fail to detect a truly infected animal is the complement of the test
sensitivity (1-Se). If multiple tests are used, then a failure to detect occurs only if all tests fail to
detect the pathogen ((1-SeTestA)*(1-SeTestB)*…)). The sensitivity and specificity of the CF and
cELISA tests were determined by the analysis described in section 3.1.1.
Diagnostic test performance can vary by animal and situation, therefore a single probability of
detection cannot be applied to a test. Instead, a probability distribution is used to address these
potential situational variations. These results were then fit into beta distributions using a risk
analysis software program @RISK (Palisade 2009) in order to reflect the uncertainty about the
true, but unknown values of these tests as applied in the field. The beta distributions for this
analysis can be found in Appendix B. Beta Distributions.
According to VS Memorandum 555.20, a horse is considered to be infected with EP if it tests
positive on either the CF or cELISA tests. A commonly used protocol is to test with CF and
cELISA in parallel; therefore, a horse would be considered uninfected only if it tested negative on
both tests. The probability of nondetection using this parallel testing approach was evaluated. The
other common scenario is testing with cELISA alone and considering a test negative animal not
infected. Thus, the probability of nondetection describes the likelihood that an infected horse will
test negative in either scenario. As noted above, there is uncertainty about the test sensitivity, so
there will be uncertainty about the nondetection probabilities as well. For example, the mean
probability of not detecting an infected horse using both tests for B. caballi is 0.88 percent. The
probability of an infected horse testing negative is shown in Table 8.
Table 8. Probability of nondetection, CF and cELISA.
Percentiles
5

th

B. caballi

T. equi

0.12%

0.03%

50

th

0.88%

0.09%

95

th

3.06%

0.26%

If a single test is used (cELISA) the nondetection probabilities increase, shown in Table 9 (must
test positive to both tests).
Table 9. Probability of nondetection, cELISA only.
Percentiles
5

th

B. caballi

T. equi

4.57%

1.26%

50

th

8.43%

3.40%

95

th

13.80%

7.10%

The probabilities calculated above can also be used to estimate the number of infected horses that
test negative for EP, given that 1,000 infected horses are tested. This is calculated by using a
binomial distribution. A binomial distribution estimates the number of successes (infected
nondetected horses) in a population (1,000 infected horses) given a probability (the probability on
nondetection).
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If both the cELISA and CF tests are used the horses must test negative to both. Therefore, the
number of truly infected horses that would test negative would be:
•

B. caballi: 9 (median), 32 (upper 95 percent), 1 (lower 5 percent)

•

T. equi: 1 (median), 4 (upper 95 percent), 0 (lower 5 percent)

If only the cELISA test is used:
•

B. caballi: 84 (median), 140 (upper 95 percent), 44 (lower 5 percent)

•

T. equi: 34 (median), 73 (upper 95 percent), 11 (lower 5 percent)

The risk of a negative exposed horse being infected undetected and allowing the release of the
pathogen off a quarantined premises is low (< 1 percent) when testing with cELISA and CF, and
moderate (1.4 percent) for B. caballi with cELISA only.

3.4. Overall Likelihood of Release _________________________________________
The risk of release is the likelihood that the movement of the pathway off a quarantined premises
will result in the successful release of B. caballi or T. equi from the premises. Horses that test
positive for either EP pathogen are a high-risk pathway for release, while infected undetected
horses pose a low risk of being infected and therefore moving an EP pathogen off a quarantined
premises (exception in B. caballi infected horses that are tested with cELISA only and pose a
moderate risk).
Table 10. Risk of release pathway.
B. caballi
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T. equi

Release pathways

Risk

Uncertainty

Risk

Uncertainty

Test positive case- cELISA only

High

Low

High

Low

Test positive case- cELISA and CF

High

Low

High

Low

Infected undetected- cELISA only

Moderate

Low

Low

Low

Infected undetected- cELISA and CF

Low

Low

Low

Low
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4. EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT
The exposure assessment estimates the likelihood of exposure and the risk of transmission if an
uninfected horse is exposed to the EP pathogen by: ticks, vertical transmission, or iatrogenic
transmission of blood or blood components.

4.1. Likelihood of Exposure to Release Pathway_____________________________
The likelihood an uninfected horse exposed to an EP pathogen by the interstate movement of a
horse off a quarantined premises is based on the generalized practices in the equine industry and
the mitigation measures discussed in section 1.4. The practices of specific sector and State
requirements will also be discussed.
4.1.1. General Biosecurity Practices
Biosecurity practices are variable throughout the equine industry. A recent study conducted by
USDA:APHIS:VS asked producers to report on common practices. General equine industry
biosecurity and biocontainment practices reported include isolation, infection control, and
equipment disinfection (USDA 2007b). Management practices also included limiting contact
between animals, insect control, manure management, and preventing feed contamination.
Insect control was reported on 88.9 percent of operations. Control measures included repellents,
reducing vegetation, emptying and refilling water containers, using facemasks on the horses, and
applying insecticides in housing areas. Some insect control measures could also be effective
against ticks.
Overall, about 65 percent of operations isolated equids for infection control. The most common
requirements were Coggins tests (45.3 percent), vaccination (36.3 percent), and worming (33.6
percent). Larger operations (20 or more horses) were most likely to require isolation followed by
medium (10-19 horses) and small operations(5-9 horses). Health evaluation and quarantine were
often practiced when new nonresident animals entered existing facilities. Quarantine prior to
contact was not often required and where resident horses departed and returned to a facility, 60.6
percent of operations did not conduct reentry quarantine. Only 2.8 percent of operations routinely
quarantined returning resident horses.
The American Association of Equine Practitioners (AAEP 2006) has published biosecurity
information, recommendations, and guidelines for equine practitioners (AAEP 2006). The AAEP
recommends multi-language instructions and that a specific individual care for an affected horse.
They also recommend restricted facility access and segregation of sick animals. The guidelines
further recommend that tack be horse-specific and shared equipment be thoroughly sanitized.
Facilities should be constructed of nonporous material, which should be periodically and
thoroughly disinfected. While many of these biosecurity practices may help reduce the risk of tick
exposure between horses, they have little impact on the iatrogenic routes of EP transmission.
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4.1.2. Industry and State Specific Requirements
While biosecurity and management practices are not well described for the equine industry, it is
recognized that some practices may be more common in various sectors. In addition,
management, testing, and movement requirements vary by State, which could impact risk. The
management of an infected horse by status (known positive or infected undetected) also has an
impact.
The current Veterinary Services memorandum restates that 9 CFR 71.3 prohibits interstate, but
does not restrict intrastate, movement of EP positive horses. Many individual States have not
formulated or universally applied EP specific quarantine and movement regulations. Examination
of a list of State movement requirements (U.S.Rider 2010) shows that only 6 of the 50 States
have equine movement regulations which specifically address EP. Some States deny entry to
horses from Texas, some deny entry of horses from “infected premises” or state that “no horse
that has ever tested positive” for EP may enter the State. Constantly changing State requirements
indicate that Web sites may not always reflect the latest movement regulations; therefore, State
specific mitigations were not considered in this assessment.
An exhaustive review of equine health management at events was last performed in 2005
(NAHMS 2006), before the current outbreaks of EP in Texas, Florida, and Missouri. The study
presented in 2005 remains the best available data and contains information, which can be used to
estimate relative risk of transmission of EP at certain events or under known conditions. In a few
cases, it can be determined that horses must be CF or cELISA negative for EP to participate in an
event, but there remains substantial possibility that events can and will occur, in which the EP
status of the participating horses is unknown.
In 2005, 57.1 percent of all events examined did not require a CVI for horses attending an event.
National events, in general, were more likely than Regional or State events to require a CVI or
Health Certificate. However, the presence of a CVI does not indicate the animals were tested for
EP; therefore, has little impact on the potential for EP spread but does indicate physical
examination by a veterinarian. A site veterinarian was present at 22.8 percent of all events but an
apparently healthy animal would remain undetected on clinical exam.
Insect control (ticks not addressed) was not performed at 49.5 percent of the events studied.
The following table estimates relative risk of EP transmission for the five industry sectors using
the likelihood of tick presence, most likely release pathway, length of direct contact with other
horses, most likely exposure pathway, and likelihood of exposure (based on biosecurity).
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Table 11. Summary of risk by sector.
Purchased additions
to small operations

Show
horses

Trail and
Sanctioned Unsanctioned
ranch horses racetrack
racetrack

Likelihood of tick
present in
environment

Moderate- climate
dependant

Low

High

Low

Moderate

Length of direct
contact with other
horses

Long

Short

Long

Short

Short to
unknown

Most likely release
pathway

Infected undetected

Confirmed
positive
horses or
infected
undetected

Infected
undetected

Confirmed
positive
horses or
infected
undetected

Infected
undetected

Most likely exposure Vectors, iatrogenic
pathway

Iatrogenic

Vectors,
iatrogenic

All unlikely

Iatrogenic

Likelihood of
exposure (based on
biosecurity)

Low

High

Low

High

High

4.1.3. Exposure to Confirmed Positive Horses
Based on characteristics of tests for EP, a confirmed positive horse that was allowed to leave a
quarantined premises has a high likelihood of actually being infected and thus causing release of
the EP pathogen. However, the limitations on movement and use of these horses assumed in this
assessment serve to limit exposure of uninfected horses to EP pathogens via any of the iatrogenic
exposure pathways examined. Acaricides applied prior to movement off the quarantined premises
would reduce the risk of an infected tick attached and the continued application of acaricide
would reduce the risk of ticks feeding on these horses. These horses are allowed to breed which
puts foals at an increased risk of exposure to T. equi. Because these horses are only allowed to
move temporarily under a permit issued by the State and identified, it is unlikely these horses
would be lost in the interstate movement process. Restricted movement of horses decreases the
likelihood that an infected horse will be a source of infection for ticks in other locations.
However, unpublished reports indicate that confirmed positive horses have bypassed monitoring
requirements when owners are unwilling to cooperate.
4.1.4. Exposure to Infected Undetected Horses
Based on the characteristics of EP tests when used in accordance with VS Memorandum 555.20,
a test-negative horse has a low likelihood of being infected undetected with EP and thus allowing
an EP pathogens to be released from the quarantined premises. However, if an animal is infected
undetected, it could leave a quarantined premises with unrestricted movement, no identification,
and no additional testing. These horses are likely to have a great deal of contact with naïve horses
in other locations and it is unknown how frequently blood doping, equipment sharing, or other
high-risk practices occur. In addition, lack of acaricide treatment, once this population has
permanently left the quarantined premises, would allow for exposure to ticks in the environment.
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The acaricide application prior to movement would reduce the risk of a tick attached at the time
of movement. No breeding restrictions are identified therefore any foal born to infected
undetected mares are at high risk of exposure to EP pathogens.

4.2. Exposure Pathway 1: Ticks ___________________________________________
Ticks may be responsible for EP transmission to an uninfected horse through two scenarios:
1) An infected tick introduced by horse movement off a quarantined premises would have to
feed directly on an uninfected horse on the new premises while infected.
2) A tick on the new premises would need to feed on an infected horse introduced and feed
on an uninfected horse while still maintaining infection.
4.2.1. Infected Tick Attached to Horse Moving Off a Quarantined Premises
In order for an infected tick to move off a quarantined premises, the tick must first become
infected with the EP pathogen on that premises and survive acaricide treatment prior to its arrival
onto the new premises. VS Memorandum 555.20 contains several mitigations designed to prevent
ticks from moving off a quarantined premises. Ticks may move off a premises by other
mechanism, but only horse movement was considered in this assessment.
Horses leaving a quarantined facility must be treated with an acaricide not less than 24 hours or
more than 14 days prior to movement. Chemical control methods are effective in reducing host
exposure to ticks, especially when appropriate chemicals are applied at times and locations that
will have the greatest impact on the developmental stages of the ticks. When spraying a horse
with an acaricide, all skin surfaces should be wetted, including the undercarriage. Acaricide
should be wiped onto the surfaces of the pinna and false nostril. Dipping is the optimal method
for applying acaricides, as this method ensures that all skin surfaces are wetted; however,
spraying is acceptable when dipping is not practical (VS Memorandum 556.1).
A laboratory study compared 17 formulations of 15 acaricides on 7 species of engorged female
ticks (Drummond and Ossorio 1988). Effectiveness was measured as a reduction in the number of
eggs produced per engorged female after exposure to a candidate acaricide. The most effective
acaricides were chlorfenvinphos, lindane, chlorphyrifos, coumaphos, diazinon, permethrin,
phosmet, amitraz, dioxathion, arsenic trioxide, malathion, tetrachlorvinphos, carbaryl, toxaphen,
and ronnel. Tick species tested included A. cajennense, A. nitens, B. annulatus, and B. microplus.
With the exceptions of permethrin and coumaphos, these compounds demonstrated toxicity to
ticks; however, most of these compounds do not meet EPA requirements for low human health
risk, rapid environmental degradation, and low ecological toxicity to nontarget organisms which
means they cannot be registered for use in the United States (EPA 2007; EPA 2008).
Problems of acaricide resistance in ticks (as a result of prolonged use), animal product
contamination, and environmental residues may render acaricide treatments ineffective over time
as a control method. Levels of tick infestation are usually decreased through the alternate use of
chemical acaricides on animals and in the environment, while considering the seasonal dynamics
of ticks (Jongejan and Uilenberg 1994). An integrated pest management (IPM) approach, as
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discussed in VS Memorandum 555.20 should be considered for tick control and to minimize
exposure to ticks in view of the increased acaricide resistance in ticks on global basis.
The likelihood of a tick carrying an EP pathogen off a premises and infecting a new horse is low
in most cases, however, the efficacy of acaricides should be monitored during prolonged usage.
The uncertainty around this is high due to the lack of understanding of resistance of some tick
species to acaricides over time, conflicting information on the topic, and possibility of incorrect
application.
4.2.2. Ticks in the Environment
In order for a tick in the environment to transmit EP, an infected horse would need to be
introduced to the premises, the tick would need to feed on the infected horse, and be capable of
transmitting the organism during subsequent feeding. For many tick borne diseases including EP,
the presence of the tick is not sufficient for an infection to occur. The major components involved
in the occurrence of a vector borne disease include: the abundance of vectors and reservoir hosts,
prevalence of pathogens within vectors and vertebrate hosts, local environment conditions
particularly temperature and moisture for tick vectors, and host resistance in the targeted host
population (Kitron and Kazmierczak 1997). Transmission of most tick-borne diseases is seasonal
because many tick species seek hosts during a well-defined period of the year. These time periods
or seasonal activities are when ticks can transmit diseases and when vertebrate hosts are most
likely at risk (Estrada-Peña 2008).
Wildlife and pet animals such as cats and dogs can serve as hosts for multiple stages of ticks,
potentially increasing equine exposure to ticks. Contact with nonequine animals was reported on
many operations. Dogs (76.9 percent of operations) and cats (66.4 percent of operations) were the
most common contact, but cattle (43.2 percent of operations), poultry (18.6 percent of operations)
and skunks-raccoons-opossums-bats (25-50 percent) were also present (NAHMS 2006).
However, these species are not considered to be reservoir hosts for EP.
The prevalence of infection in host-seeking ticks depends directly on the frequency of encounters
between ticks and reservoir hosts, which, in this case, are horses infected with EP pathogens.
Moreover, the risk of infection for hosts depends on the number of infected questing ticks and of
the number of hosts in an area. As the number of tick bites per host increases, the probability of
transmission increases, resulting in higher prevalence of infection in the host population. The
frequency of tick encounters with horses is affected by the behavior of individual ticks and
horses.
The longer the host is infected with a pathogen the greater the opportunity for transmission to
take place and less likely that the tick’s seasonal activities will influence the maintenance of
enzootic cycles. B. caballi has a relative shorter infective period in horses than T. equi, where the
horse maintains lifelong infections (Ueti, Palmer et al. 2005; Ueti, Palmer et al. 2008). The
lifelong nature of T. equi infection in horses provides a continual source for pathogen acquisition
by ticks, which is required by each tick generation as the T. equi infection cannot be maintained
by the tick alone. Ueti et al. (Ueti, Palmer et al. 2005) indicated that the threshold level for
nymphal R. microplus to acquire T. equi and have development progression of the pathogen to the
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salivary glands after molting to an adult was less than 105.8 B. equi parasites per milliliter of horse
blood. There was no difference in the percentage of adult ticks that developed infection in the
salivary glands whether they fed on a horse in the acute phase (109.4/ml) versus the chronic phase
(105.8 to 106 /ml). This is consistent with other blood-borne pathogens. Once the threshold level is
reached a further increase does not result in a larger percentage of ticks being infected. The exact
number of ticks needed to transmit T. equi to horses is unknown. There is evidence to suggest that
fewer than 10 ticks are needed to transmit the pathogen to a naïve horse. A study examined the
salivary glands of fed ticks with T. equi in their salivary glands at the time of transmission. The
minimal number of ticks with detectable T. equi in the salivary gland at the time of successful
transmission feeding varied from 4- to 10-ticks per horse (Ueti, Palmer et al. 2005). Therefore, it
appears that only a few infected ticks are required for the successful transmission of T. equi to
horses in a laboratory setting. Other possible influences on successful tick transmission are the
number of sporozoites in the tick salivary gland, pathogen, and tick strain differences, and the
duration of the tick feeding in the field and those that require further investigation.
Although Anocentor nitens, the tropical horse tick, is a natural vector of EP caused by B. caballi,
it may not be an important vector in the United States because of its limited distributional range
within southern Florida and Texas. Anocentor nitens is unable to maintain EP infections by
transovarial transmission for more than a few generations and may only be successful as a shortterm reservoir (Schwint, Knowles et al. 2008b). On the other hand, D. albipictus and D. variabilis
may be important vectors because they experimentally transovarially transmit B. caballi,
naturally infest horses, and are widely distributed throughout the United States. Rhipicepalus
microplus transtadially transmits T. equi and can be found on horses particularly if horses are kept
with cattle. Rhipicepalus microplus is distributed throughout southern Texas and is being
controlled through USDA’s cattle fever tick program. Despite the wide distributions of D.
albipictus and D. variabilis in the United States and the presence of EP infected horses, it is
unclear why EP has not become well established in these tick populations. It may be that the
frequency of contact between these tick species and horses are below the threshold to maintain or
spread EP. The lack of contact may be related to the host preferences of the immature stages of
these tick species (i.e., the American dog tick is frequently found on rodents), varying seasonal
activities of the each of the tick life stages, tick density, and animal husbandry management
practices, and low prevalence of EP in the United States. Moreover, both the level of tick
susceptibility to EP infection and the likelihood of tick-mediated transmission to a horse will vary
with tick and EP pathogen strain (Stiller and Coan, 1995).
The outbreak in Texas involved transmission by ticks, but tick mediated spread has not been
confirmed for other outbreaks in the United States. The ranch appears to be a suitable habitat for
the maintenance of large numbers of competent tick vectors (high vector density) and large
numbers of horses and cattle (high host density). In addition, the common animal management
practice of mixing horses with cattle and working horse activities (find strays in a tick habitat)
create an environment of high frequency of contact between the tick vectors and hosts. It is
possible that this situation could occur if T. equi were introduced onto another premises with
similar environment conditions and management practices. The tick populations alone cannot
sustain the EP pathogen as they are not reservoirs of the pathogen. Anocentor nitens, can only
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maintain B. caballi through one generation with no reservoir host present therefore the risk of B.
caballi establishment may be lower than T. equi.
Based on this scenario the risk of transmission from ticks in the environment, given an infected
horse enters the premises, is low assuming acaricides still maintain efficacy. However, the risk
may vary by environmental factors and vector competency. The uncertainty around this is high
due to the limited information available on EP transmission and density of vectors in the United
States. The appropriate density of infected horses, competent vectors, and environmental
conditions for the tick to survive and move through its lifecycle would be needed for EP to
persist, or the tick would need to feed directly on an uninfected horse during the same life stage.
Therefore, a tick can only become infected, and the infection maintained in a tick population,
with the presence of an infected host.

4.3. Exposure Pathway 2: Vertical Transmission ____________________________
In order for vertical transmission to cause spread of T .equi on a new premises as defined in this
assessment, the introduced horse would have to be a T. equi infected, test-negative mare that
subsequently gives birth on a new premises.
Transmission of T. equi from infected mares to their offspring in utero has been described (Phipps
and Otter 2004; Allsopp, Lewis et al. 2007). A short report from 2004 described two horses in the
United Kingdom born to a carrier mare imported from Portugal, where T. equi is endemic. The
horses were 2- and 5- years old when infection was detected on CF and IFAT. Organisms were
also detected on blood smears. An epidemiological investigation led to the conclusion that the
most likely route of transmission was transplacental (Phipps and Otter 2004). Piroplasmosis due
to T. equi is a common cause of equine abortion. In addition, in utero infection of a fetus with T.
equi can also result in the birth of foals with neonatal piroplasmosis or clinically normal carrier
foals (Erbsloh 1975; de Waal and van Heerden 2004; Phipps and Otter 2004; Allsopp, Lewis et
al. 2007; Rothschild and Knowles 2007).
In 2007, a study on transplacental transmission of T. equi in a group of 17 chronically infected
mares concluded that T. equi transmission from mother to fetus occurs across the normal placenta
and can occur as early as the first trimester of pregnancy (Allsopp, Lewis et al. 2007). The
authors were able to detect T. equi organisms via DNA probe in artificially aborted fetus as early
as 130 days gestation. In addition, the study results indicated that congenital infection of foals
born to T. equi carrier mares is common: In the study, six T. equi carrier mares were allowed to
carry foals to full term, and all foals were born clinically normal but T. equi probe positive. The
samples were collected 12 hours after birth, and the foals were kept in a tick-free experimental
barn, making tick-mediated transmission unlikely. The authors concluded that if a T. equi carrier
mare gives birth, the resultant foal would likely be infected with T. equi.
A recent case report described a foal in Trinidad that was born weak and severely icteric with
hematuria. A blood smear at 10 hours postpartum revealed that 63 percent of the foal’s red blood
cells were parasitized, and reverse line blot and nested PCR identified T. equi. The mare was
clinically healthy and a blood smear and reverse line blot were both T. equi negative. (These are
different from the standard tests approved by VS; therefore, Se/Sp for these tests has not been
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described in this document.) Nested PCR performed on the mare’s blood was T. equi positive.
The authors concluded that this case demonstrated that carrier mares could transmit T. equi to
their foals. However, based on the data in the case report, it is impossible to determine at which
point during pregnancy or parturition T. equi transmission occurred (Georges, Ezeokoli et al.
2010).
In contrast, another recent study failed to amplify T. equi DNA in 6 neonatal foals born to
chronically infected dams (3 horses, 3 donkeys) and concluded that transplacental transmission
did not occur in this group of animals (Kumar, Kumar et al. 2008). The authors argued that the
normal equine placenta should serve as a barrier to molecules as large as T. equi. The conflicting
results could be due to T. equi strain behavior, differences in host immunity, and differences in
test performance, or study design.
In the recent T. equi outbreak in Texas, there is evidence that vertical transmission, at least of that
specific strain of T. equi, is inefficient (Knowles 2010). Of the 24 mares that foaled, all 24 foals
were PCR negative at birth (USDA unpublished).
There is sufficient evidence of transplacental transmission to conclude that there is moderate risk
that the foal of a T. equi infected mare will be born infected. However, due to conflicting
evidence, the uncertainty surrounding this estimate is medium.
No evidence of vertical transmission of B. caballi resulting in infected foals was found, thus the
risk that a foal born to a mare infected with B. caballi will be infected is negligible, and the
uncertainty surrounding this estimate is medium.

4.4. Exposure Pathway 3: Iatrogenic via Blood or Blood Components___________
Horse blood is a documented source of B. caballi and T. equi infection (Sippel, Cooperrider et al.
1962; Ristic, Oppermann et al. 1964; Sibinovic, Ristic et al. 1965; Holbrook and Frerichs 1968;
Holbrook 1969; Hurcombe, Mudge et al. 2007; CFSPH 2008). Purely mechanical transmission of
EP was confirmed in a herd of British horses (Gerstenberg, Allen et al. 1999). Experimentally,
both organisms have been transmitted by direct blood inoculation (Tenter and Friedhoff 1986b;
Ueti, Palmer et al. 2005; Ueti, Palmer et al. 2008; Schwint, Ueti et al. 2009).
Transfer of blood and products could occur via direct, purposeful administration of blood (or
blood product) to a horse, or via blood contaminated fomites. The likelihood that blood, a blood
product, or a contaminated fomite will transmit EP is affected by the number of organisms in the
blood, the survivability of the pathogens, and the infectious dose.
4.4.1. Infection risk from blood
4.4.1.1. Number of Organism in Blood of an Infected Horse

In naturally infected horses, B. caballi parasitemia is frequently as low as 0.1 percent, even in
acute cases (de Waal 1992; Heim, Passos et al. 2007). The highest reported parasitemia is 10
percent (Holbrook 1969; Rothschild and Knowles 2007). Horses in the chronic, subclinical phase
of infection have parasite concentrations of less than 105 parasites per milliliter of blood
(Holman, Frerichs et al. 1993; Schwint, Knowles et al. 2008a; Schwint, Ueti et al. 2009).
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Parasitemias in natural T. equi infections typically range from 1 to 10 percent (de Waal 1992;
Friedhoff and Soulé 1996). Chronically infected, subclinical horses may have extremely low
circulating parasitemias (Maurer 1962). Parasitemias as low as 0.1 percent have been reported in
naturally infected, subclinical horses (Heim, Passos et al. 2007). However, in some cases
parasitemias can exceed 20 percent, and the highest reported parasitemia is 95 percent (Holbrook
1969; de Waal 1992; Rothschild and Knowles 2007). Experimentally, horses with chronic
infection (15- to 40-months duration) showed parasite levels which fluctuated from 103 to 106
parasites per milliliter of blood (Ueti, Palmer et al. 2005; Ueti, Palmer et al. 2008). Parasite levels
within an individual horse fluctuated over time. With both B. caballi and T. equi infection,
animals with the higher levels of parasitemia were clinically ill or moribund.
Equine piroplasmosis pathogens exist in the merozoite life stage in red blood cells. Cells infected
with B. caballi and T. equi typically have 2 or 4 merozoites per infected red cell, respectively.
Additionally, in T. equi infections, the sporozoite life stage transmitted from a tick bite initially
infects lymphocytes, which can contain up to 200 merozoites prior to rupturing and infecting new
red blood cells (Rothschild and Knowles 2007). No data is available on the percentage of
lymphocytes that would potentially be infected, or the length of time that a horse would be
expected to have infected lymphocytes following tick-mediated transmission.
The reference range for red blood cells in hot- and cold-blooded breeds is 8.2-12.2x1012 cells/L,
and 5.5-9.5x1012 cells/liter, respectively (Lording 2008). Table 12 shows the potential number of
infected red cells per milliliter of blood across horses with a variety of red blood cell concentrations
and parasitemias As the table shows, even a horse with an extreme anemia (2x109 red blood
cells/ml), and a very low parasitemia (0.05 percent), can have 5x105 infected cells per milliliter.
Table 12. Infected red blood cells per milliliter.
Number infected RBC’s per ml
RBC’s/ml
9
(x10 )

Parasitemia (%)
0.05

0.1

1

1.0x10

6

5

1.0x10

7

10

1

5.0x10

5

5.0x10

7

1.0x10

8

2

1.0x10

6

2.0x10

6

2.0x10

7

1.0x10

8

2.0x10

8

3

1.5x10

6

3.0x10

6

3.0x10

7

1.5x10

8

3.0x10

8

4

2.0x10

6

4.0x10

6

4.0x10

7

2.0x10

8

4.0x10

8

5

2.5x10

6

5.0x10

6

5.0x10

7

2.5x10

8

5.0x10

8

6

3.0x10

6

6.0x10

6

6.0x10

7

3.0x10

8

6.0x10

8

7

3.5x106

7.0x10

6

7.0x10

7

3.5x10

8

7.0x10

8

8

4.0x10

6

8.0x10

6

8.0x10

7

4.0x10

8

8.0x10

8

9

4.5x10

6

9.0x10

6

9.0x10

7

4.5x10

8

9.0x10

8

10

5.0x10

6

1.0x10

7

1.0x10

8

5.0x10

8

1.0x10

9

11

5.5x10

6

1.1x10

7

1.1x10

8

5.5x10

8

1.1x10

9

12

6.0x10

6

1.2x10

7

1.2x10

8

6.0x10

8

1.2x10

9

13

6.5x10

6

1.3x10

7

1.3x10

8

6.5x10

8

1.3x10

9
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4.4.1.2. Ability of EP Pathogens to Survive

Little conclusive information is available regarding the duration and levels of B. caballi or T. equi
infectivity in horse blood or blood products outside of the host. Babesia caballi has been reported
to remain infective in horse blood during cryopreservation (Holman, Frerichs et al. 1993). Little
information regarding the ability of the EP pathogens to survive in blood ex vivo is available.
However, a body of published work exists concerning Babesia microti, a related organism with a
similar life history and characteristics (Homer, Aguilar-Delfin et al. 2000; Uilenberg 2006).
Blood from hamsters experimentally infected with B. microti was able to infect naïve hamsters
for up to 3 days if stored at room temperature, and for up to 21 days if refrigerated under
conditions similar to those in a human blood bank. The blood used in this experiment was treated
with EDTA to prevent coagulation (Eberhard, Walker et al. 1995). Transfusions of red blood
cells, deglycerolized red blood cells, and platelets have transmitted B. microti to humans. In order
for this transmission to occur, the pathogens survived common blood bank procedures including
refrigeration, removal of white blood cells, filtration, and freezing. It is thought that Babesia sp.
can survive freezing because the glycerol added during the process prevents red blood cell lysis
(Gubernot, Lucey et al. 2009). EP pathogen spread via blood contaminated fomites has been
documented, indicating that the EP pathogens can survive in blood ex vivo for at least some
period of time.
4.4.1.3. Infectious Dose

A definitive infectious dose of either EP pathogen was not found. Experimentally, inoculation of
105.2 organisms into naïve horses resulted in B. caballi infection, but the authors were not
specifically attempting to determine infectious dose (Schwint, Ueti et al. 2009). Infectious dose of
B. bovis for calves is less than 100 organisms (Goff, Johnson et al. 1998). Schwint et al., used
those findings to conclude that the infectious dose for babesial organisms in general is less than
100 organisms (Schwint, Ueti et al. 2009).
4.4.2. Administration of Blood or Blood Components from a Known Donor
In this portion of the assessment, the term “known donor” is used because it is assumed that the
team performing a blood transfusion also removes the blood from the donor horse, rather than
purchasing the blood from a licensed source (covered in section 4.4.4). Thus, the medical team
knows the identity of the horse being used as a blood donor.
This section discusses situations during which blood or blood components are collected from a
known donor and are administered to a horse under the direction of a veterinarian for the
purposes of correcting a medical problem. For the purposes of this risk assessment, this process
will be referred to as transfusion. In order for an EP infected horse to spread EP under this
scenario, the infected horse would need to be used as a donor for a transfusion (use of
contaminated needles or transfusion equipment is covered in section 4.4.5).
The most common substance used in equine transfusions is whole blood, which consists of blood
from a donor without components removed or separated. Stored whole blood is still not widely or
readily available in equine practice, and its use is still relatively expensive (David 2009). Within
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the context of a veterinary client patient relationship, veterinarians can legally administer
unlicensed blood and blood products, including keeping a donor horse at their practice (Kaler,
Curry-Galvin et al. 2006; Evans 2010). Thus, the majority of whole blood transfused into horses
in veterinary practice is collected by the veterinarian performing the transfusion from a known
donor horse (Slovis and Murray 2001; David 2009) It is recommended that whole blood be used
within 24 hours of collection. Many equine blood donors are pre-identified as donors and are
typically housed at a veterinary practice or privately owned location by a client of the practice
(David 2009). In emergency situations, however, veterinary tests and the AAEP transfusion
guidelines describe the appropriate use of a horse that has not been pre-screened as a donor.
Quarterhorses, standardbreds, and Morgans have a low prevalence of genes coding for highly
immunogenic equine alloantigens, and thus are preferred blood donor horses (Slovis and Murray
2001; David 2009).
Standard guidelines for infectious disease screening of equine blood donors were not found.
Published articles, including the American Association of Equine Practitioners’ conference
proceedings, recommend that the donor should be generally healthy and free of infectious
disease. In the literature published in the United States, a test for Equine Infectious Anemia (EIA)
is the only infectious disease screening specifically mentioned (Gonzales 2001). Several available
equine medicine textbooks were reviewed, and piroplasmosis testing for blood donor horses was
not specifically suggested (Corley and Stephen 2008; Muir and Hubbell 2008; David 2009; Reed,
Bayley et al. 2009). More recently, APHIS published a factsheet that recommended that all horses
being considered for use as blood donors be tested for EP (USDA 2010b). Heightened awareness
of EP will likely lead to increased testing, but it is unclear at this time the proportion of equine
blood donors that are being tested for piroplasmosis.
Blood from a known donor in a medical setting could potentially be separated into its component
parts, for example plasma, or concentrated red cells. The level of contamination of plasma with
red or white blood cells depends on the method used to separate the plasma, though plasma
produced in a hospital setting is likely to have cell contamination (see section 4.4.1).
Blood donation is a relatively uncommon procedure and any one individual horse has a low
likelihood of being chosen as a donor. For this assessment, it is assumed that a confirmed positive
case would be moving off the quarantined premises temporarily, would be identified, would have
location and transportation monitored, and would not be allowed to donate blood. A horse with a
history of residency on an EP affected premises but tested negative would be unlikely to be
chosen if its history is known. However, negative horses are not required to be tracked or
retested. Testing for EP is becoming more common but not standard across the industry, therefore
an apparently healthy EP infected donor would be as likely as any other horse to be used as a
donor.
As described in the hazard identification, T. equi and B. caballi are intraerthrocytic parasites. A
critically ill horse may receive up to 10 liters of blood in a single transfusion (Slovis and Murray
2001; David 2009). Thus, even a donor with low parasitemia would transmit a large number of
organisms to the recipient. In addition, horses receiving blood in a medical situation are generally
severely compromised. Therefore, the likelihood of transmission of either EP pathogen, when an
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infected donor is used, is high. Because the transmissibility of the organism through small
amounts of blood is well documented, the uncertainty surrounding this conclusion is low.
4.4.3. Blood Doping
Blood doping, the administration of large volumes of blood or concentrated red blood cells from a
donor horse prior to racing, was reported as one of the practices used by those involved in bush
track Quarter Horse racing in Florida (Holt 2008). Other names for this practice are blood
boosting or blood packing.
The frequency of “blood doping” in the equine industry is unknown. It is unlikely that the donors
would be screened for EP or other diseases. Anecdotally, this practice is prevalent in the
unsanctioned racing segment of the industry. Unpublished epidemiology reports from Florida and
Missouri indicate that unsanitary management practices such blood doping and sharing needles or
syringes between horses are the most likely cause of transmission of EP on premises where
competent natural vectors do not exist.
APHIS published an information sheet targeted at horse owners and trainers in 2010 (USDA
2010b) This sheet recommended testing all blood donor horses for EP. However, it is unlikely
that this practice has become commonplace among individuals who perform blood doping.
As with medical transfusion (above) a large volume of blood or blood product is given to the
recipient. Therefore, if a donor is infected, the risk of transmission is high. The uncertainty
surrounding this estimate is low.
4.4.4. Commercial Plasma and Serum Products
Equine plasma and serum products are used to treat a variety of equine diseases, such as failure of
passive transfer, septicemia, clotting disorders, and certain infectious diseases. Plasma is also
administered in some cases of acute blood loss to expand blood volume and replace lost proteins
and clotting factors. Under the conditions of this assessment, the introduced positive horse would
need to be the donor of this plasma or serum in order for risk to occur. A literature review
revealed no cases of commercially available horse blood or blood products serving as sources of
B. caballi or T. equi infection.
Plasma and serum are produced by various methods of removing red and white blood cells from
whole blood. Plasma contains clotting factors, while serum does not. Blood cell contamination
(red or white) can lead to adverse reactions in the recipient, and cell degradation during storage
decreases plasma quality (Feige, Ehrat et al. 2003). Thus, it is beneficial to create serum/plasma
products with as few cells as possible. Techniques to separate plasma from blood cells include
gravity sedimentation, centrifugation, plasmapheresis (applicable to plasma only) (Feige, Ehrat et
al. 2003; Kaler, Curry-Galvin et al. 2006). Plasma prepared by plasmapheresis has fewer red and
white blood cells than plasma prepared by gravity sedimentation or centrifugation (Feige, Ehrat et
al. 2003). The results are summarized in Table 13.
The differences between the three speeds of plasmapheresis were not statistically significant,
while the differences between the three methods were statistically significant.
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Table 13. Absolute counts of erythrocytes and leukocytes per milliliter, by plasma preparation
method.
Median cells per microliter (range)
Production Method

Erythrocytes

Leucocytes

Plasmapheresis (70 ml/min)

0.0 (0.0-2.5)

0.0 (0.0-0.0)

Plasmapheresis (85ml/min)

1.3 (0.0-5.0)

0.0(0.0-5.0)

Plasmapheresis (100 ml/min)

2.5 (0.0-22.5)

0.0 (0.0-7.5)

Blood bag centrifugation

615 (520-800)

10 (10-700)

Gravity Sedimentation

935(700-1200)

2900 (700-3800)

Adapted from (Feige, Ehrat et al. 2003)

Plasma and serums are given in large quantities (measured in liters rather than milliliters). A liter
of plasma or serum containing only 2.5 red cells per microliter from an infected donor with a low
parasitemia (0.05 percent) could contain 1,250 infected red cells. As the red cell contamination of
the product increases, so does the number of infected red cells per liter. Note that T. equi
replicates in equine white blood cells following a bite by infected tick. It is unknown how this
relates to iatrogenic horse-to-horse transmission.
A wide variety of commercial plasma and serum products are available. However, under the
Virus, Serum, and Toxins Act, only products that make specific “disease prevention or treatment
claims” are required to have a license by the USDA. In order to obtain a license, these products
must meet various conditions for safety and efficacy. Most relevant to this assessment, USDA
licensed products are required to take certain steps to ensure that donor horses are free of
infectious diseases. Donor horses must be clinically healthy and maintained at a licensed facility
in a closed herd. New donors must be quarantined. Donors also are tested for piroplasmosis prior
to entering the herd, however, no specific test is recommended, and yearly testing is not required.
Therefore, some infected animals may be undetected (see section 3.3).
Products may be exempted from federal licensing requirements if licensed under a State program
for intrastate movement if State requirements meet Federal standards (Kaler, Curry-Galvin et al.
2006; Evans 2010; USDA 2010a). As of 2009, the only program that met Federal requirements
was California. The use of a licensed product is recommended whenever possible (AAEP 2009).
There are no red or white blood cell contamination limits for USDA licensed products (Evans
2010).
Currently, there are only three USDA licensed producers of equine plasma; all of these use
plasmapheresis. Some commercial plasma products produced by plasmapheresis are guaranteed
by the manufacturer to be free of all blood cells (Hardefeldt, Keuler et al. 2010). Plasmapheresis
requires a special machine, and there are no commercially available systems designed for use in
horses. Therefore, firms that use plasmapheresis to produce plasma must take the time and
expense to modify a human machine. The licensed serum producers currently use sedimentation
or centrifugation (Evans 2010).
Equine blood and serum products that do not make specific disease prevention or treatment
claims fall under the regulatory authority of the Food and Drug Administration’s Center for
Exposure Assessment
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Veterinary Medicine (CVM). However, these products are low regulatory priority for the CVM,
and there is no official approval process in place (Kaler, Curry-Galvin et al. 2006; AAEP 2009).
Administration of unlicensed products within the context of a veterinary client patient
relationship is legal (Kaler, Curry-Galvin et al. 2006; Evans 2010). In a 2009 white paper, the
American Association of Equine Practitioners concluded that “equine plasma and serum products
which make no disease or treatment claims are manufactured and sold without regulatory
oversight.” Therefore, veterinarians cannot be assured of the disease status of donor horses, or the
quality of the process used to create the product. These products are most likely produced using
centrifugation or sedimentation methods.
The likelihood that the donor will be EP infected is determined by management practices and
testing of donors. The testing process for licensed products reduces the likelihood of using an
infected donor, though infected donors may not be detected on all tests. Under the assumptions in
this document, confirmed cases would not be allowed to enter into commercial plasma or serum
production. In addition, horses with a known history of residence on a premises with an EP
infected horse would be unlikely to be used as a donor, but, as described previously, these horses
may not be identified. Horses used as donors in production of unlicensed products are less likely
to be tested for EP, though no specific information is available on the practices of this industry.
No information was available on the amount of plasma and serum products used in the equine
industry.
In summary, the majority of plasma and serum products will have blood cell contamination.
Administration of large volumes increases recipient exposure to potentially parasitized cells.
Even at very low levels of contamination and an EP infected donor with very low parasitemia, a
liter of plasma or serum could contain over 1,000 infected red cells. Therefore, the risk of
transmission if the donor is infected with either EP pathogen is high. The uncertainty surrounding
this estimate is low.
4.4.5. Contaminated Equipment
Contaminated hypodermic needles, syringes, and surgical instruments have been implicated as
sources or potential sources of EP pathogen transmission (Callow 1984; Hermann, Baumann et
al. 1987; Friedhoff 1988; Gerstenberg, Allen et al. 1999; Rothschild and Knowles 2007; CFSPH
2008; DAFF 2008; OIE 2009d; OIE 2009c). Reuse of syringes (but not needles) in a group of
horses that had been bled regularly over several years resulted in T. equi infection of 61/66
horses. This scenario led to exposure to very small to miniscule amounts of blood, but resulted in
very high transmission rates (Gerstenberg, Allen et al. 1999). When blood smears of 8 CF and
IFAT positive mares were examined, parasites were identified in 4 mares, and parasitemia was
less than 0.1 percent in all mares.
A small number of studies have examined residual blood volume in needles and syringes in
human needlestick injuries and needle/syringe sharing. Needlesticks with 21 or 22 gauge needles
transferred less than 1 microliter of blood (Hoffman, Larkin et al. 1989; Gaughwin, Gowans et al.
1991). These studies were designed to model accidental needle injuries sustained by health care
professionals, in which the needle is in contact with the stick victim for a very short amount of
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time and penetrates skin or muscle. Subcutaneous or intramuscular injections in horses may be
given with larger needles, and the needle remains inside the animal for enough time to inject a
volume of fluid.
In needle sharing studies designed to simulate shared use of a needle and syringe for intravenous
use, blood is drawn back into the syringe until just visible to check placement in the vein. Using a
2ml syringe and 25 gauge needle, one author demonstrated that a mean volume of 34 microliters
of blood was transferred to the next user, with a range of 18-67 microliters over 20 trials
(Hoffman, Larkin et al. 1989). Another research team estimated that the amount of blood
transferred to the first subsequent user with a re-used or shared 22 gauge needle/1 ml syringe, and
a re-used or shared 20 gauge needle/2ml syringe was approximately 0.5 and 5 microliters,
respectively. When 0.5ml of blood was drawn into the syringe and ejected twice, the amount of
blood transferred was up to 5 times greater. Washing with tap water decreased, but did not
eliminate, transfer of blood. The authors concluded that regardless of the initial amount of blood
contamination or washing, 2ml syringes transfer significantly more blood to a subsequent user
than 1ml syringes (Gaughwin, Gowans et al. 1991). Another author hypothesized that the reason
for this difference is the presence of a hub for a detachable needle on 2ml syringes. The hub
creates a space between the plunger and the needle, which holds additional liquid, even when the
plunger is fully depressed (Grund and Stern 1991).
In equine practice, the needles and syringes used for blood collection or intravenous
administration of substances are generally larger than the equipment used in humans. This creates
additional space for residual blood to collect. In addition, equipment such as intravenous
administration sets and dental equipment can also transfer blood between horses.
As discussed above, previous incidents have demonstrated that the relatively small amounts of
blood on contaminated needles and equipment can transmit the EP pathogens. As shown in Table
13 from 4.3, even a horse with an unrealistically low total number of red cells (2x109/ml), and a
very low parasitemia (0.05 percent) will have 106 infected cells per milliliter, or 1,000 infected
cells in one microliter of blood. Based on the studies above, contaminated needles and syringes
that have been used for venipuncture in horses could realistically have at least 5 microliters of
residual blood, for 20,000 infected cells given an infected horse with mid-range red cell numbers
(8x109/ml) a low parasitemia (0.05 percent).
Washing with water only is likely to remove some, but not all blood (Gaughwin, Gowans et al.
1991). The addition of a detergent will increase the amount of organic material, including blood,
that is removed (Rutala, Weber et al. 2008). The efficacy of disinfectants against intraerythrocytic
pathogens like the EP pathogens is not well described, as these pathogens are assumed to have
limited survival time outside the host (OIE 2009f).
The likelihood of exposure to contaminated veterinary equipment is determined by management
practices. It is assumed that equipment contaminated with blood from a known infected horse
would be cleaned prior to use, but cleaning may not be sufficient to eliminate EP infectivity. The
American Association of Equine Practioners has published biosecurity information,
recommendations and guidelines for equine practitioners (AAEP 2006). These guidelines do not

Exposure Assessment

35

USDA:APHIS:VS:CEAH:National Center for Risk Analysis

mention use or reuse of needles or other equipment. The recent APHIS information sheet clearly
recommends against needle resuse and other risky practices, such as reusing uncleaned dental and
surgical equipment (USDA 2010b).
No information is available regarding the duration of B. caballi or T. equi infectivity on
contaminated equipment. Based on documented instances of transmission and the relatively high
number of organisms present in even very small amounts of blood, the risk of transmission of
either EP pathogen resulting from exposure to contaminated veterinary equipment is high. The
uncertainty surrounding this estimate is medium due to the lack of information regarding the
survival of the organisms.
4.4.6. Germplasm
Horse germplasm is considered here as a commodity already harvested from the source horse.
Theoretically, pathogen-contaminated blood associated with germplasm from an infected horse
could be a pathogen source (Metcalf 2001). Under the assumptions in this risk assessment, the
germplasm would be collected from the infected horse after it had been allowed to move from a
piroplasmosis quarantined premises. We found no reports of EP pathogen detection in equid
germplasm, and no reports of pathogen transmission from contaminated germplasm. We found no
reports that EP is transmitted venereally or through assisted reproduction.
Because of the lack of evidence that equid germplasm is associated with transmission of EP and
handling that limits blood contamination, germplasm from an infected horse moved off
quarantined premises poses negligible risk for EP spread.

4.5. Overall Risk of Exposure_____________________________________________
The overall risk of exposure is based on the likelihood of successful transmission to an uninfected
horse via the exposure pathway.
Table 14. Risk of exposure pathways.
Exposure Pathway
Ticks
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Risk

B. caballi
Uncertainty

Risk

T. equi
Uncertainty

Infected tick moving off
quarantined premises

Low

Medium

Low

Medium

Ticks on premises

Low

High

Low

High

Vertical

Vertical transmission

Negligible

Low

Moderate

Medium

Iatrogenic

Blood transfusion (medical
purposes)

High

Low

High

Low

Blood doping

High

Low

High

Low

Commercial serum/blood plasma

High

Low

High

Low

Contaminated equipment

High

Medium

High

Medium

Germplasm

Negligible

Low

Negligible

Low
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5. OVERALL RISK ESTIMATION
The overall estimation of risk is based on the risk of release, the likelihood of exposure, and the
likelihood that exposure leads to transmission. As discussed, simple horse-to-horse contact is not
sufficient to transmit EP. Several exposure pathways, including tick transmission, vertical
transmission, and iatrogenic mechanisms were examined.
This assessment examined the likelihood that the EP pathogen would leave a quarantined
premises (release) and subsequently cause infection of a naïve horse (exposure). The exposure
pathways examined are shown in Table 15.
Ticks pose a low risk of introducing or spreading infection onto a new premises. Iatrogenic
transmission of blood from transfusions, blood doping, contaminated equipment, and commercial
serum/blood plasma products is the most likely mechanism for new horses to acquire infection
and mitigation efforts should focus on measures to ensure that infected horses, including those
that are test negative, are not used for these purposes.
The movement of confirmed positive horses poses a high risk of EP release from a quarantined
premises. It is assumed these horses undergo stringent biosecurity measures to minimize contact
with uninfected horses. However, if iatrogenic exposure does occur, the risk of transmission is
high. Therefore, the overall risk of this pathway is moderate. Additional enforcement to ensure
iatrogenic exposure does not occur would minimize this risk.
The movement of infected undetected horses poses a low risk of EP release, however after
released from a quarantined premises, these horse are presumed to move freely in the population.
No additional testing, acaricide treatment, or identification is required of this population. It is
unknown how frequently iatrogenic exposure occurs and any iatrogenic exposure is likely to
result in infection, therefore the overall risk of this pathway is moderate.
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Table 15. Overall risk estimation.
Release Pathways
Confirmed Positive Horse
Exposure Pathways

T. equi

B. caballi

Infected Undetected Horse
T. equi

B. caballi

CF and cELISA

Risk of release

High

High

Low

Low

cELISA only

Risk of release

High

High

Low

Moderate

Ticks attached to horse
leaving quarantined
premises

Risk of Transmission

Low

Low

Low*

Low

Likelihood of Exposure

Low

Low

Low

Low

Ticks in environment

Risk of Transmission

Low

Low

Low

Low

Likelihood of Exposure

Low

Low

High

High

Risk of Transmission

Moderate

Negligible

Moderate

Negligible

Likelihood of Exposure

High

High

High

High

Blood transfusionmedical

Risk of Transmission

High

High

High

High

Likelihood of Exposure

Low

Low

High

high

Blood doping

Risk of Transmission

High

High

High

High

Likelihood of Exposure

Low

Low

High

High

Commercial
Serum/Plasma

Risk of Transmission

High

High

High

High

Likelihood of Exposure

Low

Low

High

High

Contaminated Equipment

Risk of Transmission

High

High

High

High

Likelihood of Exposure

Low

Low

High

High

Risk of Transmission

Negligible

Negligible

Negligible

Negligible

Likelihood of Exposure

Low

Low

High

High

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Vertical Transmission

Germplasm
Overall Risk

*Moderate when male ticks of the following species are infected D.variabilis, A. cajennense, and R. microplus
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6. DATA LIMITATIONS
6.1. Ticks _____________________________________________________________
The high degree of uncertainty about these risk estimations is based on lack of available data. To
gain a better understanding of the role of U.S. tick species in EP transmission, additional work is
needed to understand the ecology of these vectors, density, and distribution. Transmission studies
with U.S. tick species are also needed to better understand the unique cycle of transmission. In
addition, studies are needed to better understand acaricide efficacy on cayenne tick or how
effective it will remain over time.

6.2. Biosecurity ________________________________________________________
Additional information is also needed about biosecurity practices in various industries so that
mitigation efforts can focus on the sectors of highest risk. USDA is currently unable to measure
how well these mitigation measures are being implemented or enforced.

6.3. Test Performance ___________________________________________________
Due to the differences in cELISA tests available for EP, additional information is needed to
compare NVSL versus licensed kit cELISA performance on B. caballi organisms.

Data Limitations
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APPENDIX A. LITERATURE REVIEW OF EP RELEASE AND EXPOSURE
Location of
Estimated Index case
introduction Introduction detected
or spread
(year)
(year)

Pathogen

Source of
introduction

Mechanism
of spread Summary of outbreak

References

Release and Exposure
United States 1959 or 1960 1961
(Florida)

B. caballi

Walking Horses D. nitens
from Cuba

372 cases of B. caballi (Sippel, Cooperrider et
infection in horses in al. 1962; Cooperrider
Florida until 1969
1963; Taylor, Bryant et
al. 1969; Knowles
1988)

Australia

1950s and
1960s

1976

T. equi

Quarter horses
from Texas

Total number infected (Callow 1984)
not reported; includes
more than 50 locally
bred horses.

Switzerland

Unknown

1985

T. equi

Horse of
Needle
unknown origin sharing

United
Kingdom

1981

1996

T. equi

Horse from
North Africa

Syringe reuse 61/66 mares in an
experimental herd of
horses and donkeys

United
Kingdom

≥8 years
prior to
detection

Not reported T. equi

Horses from
Portugal

Vertical

At least four infected (Phipps and Otter 2004)
horses were imported
(three mares and one
stallion). Vertical
transmission from one
mare to at least two
offspring.

Needle
sharing

Twenty horses on
seven premises.

(OIE 2009d)

Needle
sharing

Fourteen racehorses
on one premises.

(Hermann, Baumann et
al. 1987)
(Gerstenberg, Allen et
al. 1999)

United States Not reported 2008
(Florida)

T. equi

Two horses
from Mexico

Ireland

Not reported 2009

T. equi

Reported as “an Iatrogenic
animal”
returning from
an EP endemic
region

Fifty horses on six
premises

(OIE 2009e)

1970s

1976

T. equi

Andalusian
horses from
Spain

No spread
reported

Thirty horses in three
geographic regions of
Australia.

(Callow, McGregor et
al. 1979; Callow 1984)

United States 1988
(California)

1993

T. equi

Horse from
France, or
exposure in
Florida

No spread
reported

One Selle Français
warmblood gelding.

(Holman, Hietala et al.
1997)

Germany

Within one
year prior to
detection

1997-1999

B. caballi & Horses from
No spread
T. equi
various
reported
countries in
Europe, Russia,
and Ukraine

Eighteen horses.

(Zahler and Gothe
2000)

Hong Kong

1999

2000

T. equi

One Thoroughbred
gelding.

(Sippel, Cooperrider et
al. 1962)

Release only
Australia

Horse from
South Africa

No spread
reported
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Location of
Estimated Index case
introduction Introduction detected
or spread
(year)
(year)
2000

Pathogen

Australia

2000

United
Kingdom

Not reported Not reported B. caballi

T. equi

Presumed
Source of
introduction

Mechanism
of spread Summary of outbreak

References

Horse from
Hong Kong

No spread
reported

One Thoroughbred
gelding.

Horse from
Portugal

No spread
reported

One mare.
(Phipps and Otter
Seropositive for both T. 2004)
equi and B. caballi.

(Ellis 2000)

Exposure only, or insufficient information to categorize
Panama

Not reported 1913

B. caballi

Horses in
Panama

D. nitens or
A.
cajennense

One “American driving (Darling 1913)
horse”, shipped from
the United States to
the Panama Canal
Zone; developed
clinical signs 4 days
after exposure to
“native ponies” and
ticks. Reported as "the
first record of the
parasite (B. caballi) in
America".

Panama

Not reported 1922

Not
reported

Horses in
Panama

D. nitens

Seventeen Army
(Kelser 1922)
horses in the Panama
Canal Zone

United States Not reported 1962-1969
(multiple
States)

B. caballi

Exposure to
horses from
Florida or
Puerto Rico

(Taylor, Bryant et al.
Not reported Number of infected
horses: Arkansas, 2;
1969)
Georgia, 4; Mississippi,
1; New Jersey, 6;
North Carolina, 2;
Tennessee, 26

United States Not reported 1964
(Florida)

B. caballi
&T. equi

Not reported

Not reported One horse

(Riek 1964)

United States Not reported 1965
(Florida)

T. equi

Not reported

Not reported One Thoroughbred
horse in southern
Florida

(Knowles, Mathis et al.
1966; Holbrook and
Frerichs 1968)

United States 1967
(New Jersey)

1967

T. equi

Not reported

Not reported One horse on U.S.
(Holbrook and Frerichs
Olympic jumping team, 1968; Taylor, Bryant et
returning from France al. 1969)

Not reported

Not reported 1977

T. equi

Horses from
Jordan

Needle
sharing

Number of horses not
reported.

Switzerland

Not reported 1994

T. equi

Not reported

Tick? (weak
evidence).

First documented
(Gottstein, Pauli et al.
autochthonous case of 1995; Sigg, Gerber et
EP in Switzerland.
al. 2010)

United States Not reported 2009
(Missouri)

T. equi

Not reported

Needle
sharing

Eight quarter horses

48

Appendix A. Literature Review of EP Release and Exposure

(Knowles 1988)

(OIE 2009b)

USDA:APHIS:VS:CEAH:National Center for Risk Analysis

Location of
Estimated Index case
introduction Introduction detected
or spread
(year)
(year)

Pathogen

Source of
introduction

EP Domestic Pathways Assessment (2011)

Mechanism
of spread

Summary of
outbreak

References

United States Not reported 2009
(multiple
States)

T. equi

Not reported

A.
cajennense

United States Not reported 2009
(multiple
States)

T. equi

Not reported

Not reported Event not yet resolved; (OIE 2010b)
79 cases in six States
(NM, TX, CO, OK, GA,
NC).

United States- Not reported 2010
New Mexico

B. caballi

Not reported

Management One Quarter horse
practices
race pony
(euthanized)

United States Not reported 2010
(multiple
States)

B. caballi

United
Kingdom

Not
reported

Cuba

Not reported 2010

B. caballi
1951
(report date) and T. equi

Event not yet resolved; (USDA Sit Rep, Nov 2010,
408 horses in seven
unpublished)
States (TX, AL, CO,
LA, IN, NC, TN)

(OIE 2010c)

Event not yet resolved. (OIE 2010a)
Horse in NM: “under
quarantine” per July
19, 2010 OIE
immediate notification
report; implies that this
is not the same horse
(euthanized) as listed
in row above.
As of OIE follow-up
report 1: one horse in
each of NM, TX, and
IA.
Not reported

Not reported In an OIE immediate
notification report on
equine infectious
anemia: “The horse
was also found to be
positive for
piroplasmosis.”
D. nitens

“A group of horses that
the Cuban army
purchased from the
United States”

(OIE 2010d)

(Roby, Anthony et al. 1964)
secondary ref.; primary
requested (de la Fuente,
Naranjo et al. 2004)
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APPENDIX B. BETA DISTRIBUTIONS

A.

B. caballi cElisa Sensitivity

C.

T. equi cELISA Sensitivity
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B.

D.

B. caballi CF Sensitivity

T Equi CF Sensitivity
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APPENDIX C. PERFORMANCE OF DIAGNOSTIC TESTS OVER TIME
Organism: T. equi
Time to Detection
Blood
Smear

CF
11-20
days

IFAT

Time to Negative Test
cELISA

7-14
days

Blood
Smear
364-455
days

CF

IFAT

63-174
days

>476
days

Infection
Method

cELISA

Reference

Inoculation of
sporozoites

(Tenter and
Friedhoff 1986a)

2 weeks

3 weeks

8
weeks

>115
weeks

Inoculation

(Knowles,
Kappmeyer et al.
1992)

2 weeks

7 weeks

10>115
weeks

>115
weeks

Experimental
tick
transmission

(Knowles,
Kappmeyer et al.
1992)

4.7 days

1 week

11 days

>22
weeks

Inoculation of
erythrocytes

(Cunha, McGuire et
al. 2006)

13 days

3 weeks

7 weeks

>22
weeks

Experimental
tick
transmission

(Cunha, McGuire et
al. 2006)

2-19
days

4-17
days

2-4 days

2-10
days

3-20
days

30.4
days

21.9
days

>220
days

>220
days

540>540
days

>540
days

>220
days

(Weiland 1986)
Inoculation of
erythrocytes

(Kuttler, Goff et al.
1988)

Organism: B. caballi
Time to Detection
Sample
Size

Blood
Smear

3

CF
13-15
days

6

10-15
days

12-17
days

9

2-4 days

2-10
days

IFAT

Time to Negative Test
cELISA

Blood
Smear

10-11
days

3-20 days

CF
80-140
days

5-15
days

11-15
days

>30
days

2-19
days

4-17
days

67 days

IFAT

cELISA

>190
days

>220
days

Infection
Method

Reference

Inoculation
(Tenter and
of
Friedhoff 1986a)
erythrocytes
>30
days

(Ikadai, Osorio et
al. 2000)

>220
days

(Weiland 1986)
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